In the article “Democratization, Elite Transition, and Violence in Cambodia, 1991-1999”, published on 21 October 2010 in Critical Asian Studies, David Roberts spoke about the influence of the elite’s role in managing the transition of democratization in Cambodia from 1991 to 1999. He discussed reasons, and approaches that brought elites to reform or not reform away from personal interest and self-aggrandizement and lead to fairly represent the whole interest groups.
Starting from the general view of democratization, David has identified
that there were 3 main characteristics of transition in Cambodia. The first
characteristic was the continuing to maintain a specific balance of power
between the Cambodian People’s Party and FUNCINPEC Party. Second, it was the power
distribution issue. Cambodian politicians tried to
solve this problem by extending polity but with reducing job base that provides
a small chance of elected representatives of opposition parties to access to the
wealth-and status-creating power position. Third, the economic aid that
Cambodia got from various sources after signing the Paris Peace Agreement in
1991 had flowed to the pocket of elite politicians and businessmen tied to
politicians and parties.
David Roberts used the Cambodian case as a hypothesis to test Dankwart
Rustow’s theory of democratization. In Dankwart Rustow’s theory, there are 3
phases of a positive transitional process – preparation, decision, and
habituation phase - that can achieve democratization. After testing, David argued that preparation
phase of transition, a long and
inclusive political struggle normally between elites who are deeply entrenched
over specific issues, clearly survived the Cambodian conflict intact. However,
the decision phase, group leaders begin the process of accepting difference and
then seek to institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure, did
not emerge insufficient strength to sustain peaceful relations between protagonists
- Cambodian People’s Party and FUNCINPEC Party. Following the insufficient strength in the decision phase, it
prevented the habituation phase, political leaders learning from the successful
resolution of some issues and thereby placing their trust in the new rules and
procedures, to happen. Finally, David concluded that Dankwart Rustow’s model of
democratization is not sufficiently useful as a model to study the transition
from violence to politics through the democratic procedure in Cambodia.
The strongest point of this research is the accommodation of hegemonic
party - Cambodian People’s Party – to the needs of opposition’s elite and create
institutions to extend political positions to place elites in those positions
which brought the stability in democratization transition in Cambodia. “The
stability in the transition from an authoritarian single-party state to a
competitive pluralist society in Cambodia is reliable when hegemon party
accommodate the requirements of the elite of the new party to be able to
sustain itself through traditional means, such as rewarding those who support
them through networks of patronage and clientelism. That hegemon must also
recognize the necessity to create institutions that facilitate these concerns”
(David Roberts).
What makes this article weak is David Roberts missed to discuss the role
of Khmer Rouge party in the process of democratization in the transitional
period. He focused more on only the role of two main parties, Cambodian People’s
Party and FUNCINPEC Party, in the transitional period. In 1991, Four Cambodian
conflicting parties, namely the State of Cambodia (Cambodia People's Party) led
by Hun Sen, the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front led by Son Sann,
FUNCINPEC led by Prince Norodom Rannariddh and the Khmer Rouge led by Khieu
Samphan, singed Paris Peace Agreement to end the Cambodian civil war and put the
country on the path towards democracy. Following
the peace agreement, the United Nations organized a national election to elect a
new Cambodian government in 1993. However, Khmer Rouge boycotted 1993
national elections and vowed to continue the fight. Khmer Rouge still struggled
to Cambodian peace and democratization process. With the win-win policy of Hun
Sen[1],
Khmer Rouge soldiers joined with Hun Sen government in 1999. Starting from that
point, Khmer Rouge soldiers have worked with Cambodian government without
confrontation anymore.
The future research on democratization in Cambodia in the post-cold
war should also focus on the role of the Khmer Rouge party that struggles to the
democratization transition, and the win-win
policy of Hun Sen which brought Khmer Rouge soldiers to unite with the Cambodian
government and end the conflicts in Cambodia in 1999 that was a pathway to towards
democracy in the kingdom.
[1] Win-Win
Policy is a policy of Hun Sen, current Cambodian Prime Minister, to unify
Cambodia in 1999, which it was introduced to end the conflict between Hun Sen
government and Khmer Rouge Party. It means all former Khmer Rouge soldiers and
civilians would be recognized as legal citizens of Cambodia, with the right to
retain their current property as well as hold administrative positions in the
area.
No comments:
Post a Comment